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WHERE ARE THE GATEKEEPERS? CHALLENGING UTAH’S
THRESHOLD STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT WITNESS
TESTIMONY
Samuel D. Hatch*
INTRODUCTION
It is well established that trial courts act as gatekeepers to shield the jury from
unreliable expert witness testimony,1 but in Utah the gatekeepers have all but
vanished. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 702, a proponent of expert testimony need
only make a threshold showing of reliability to gain a stamp of approval and be
admitted into Utah courts.2 This standard has steadily shriveled since its inception
in 2007 and now requires little more than a nod of the gatekeeper’s head.3 With such
a low bar to clear, trial courts must now admit virtually all expert testimony.4 This,
in turn, has progressively increased the risk of admitting faulty and unreliable
testimony.5 When the State of Utah originally adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence
several years prior to 2007, it did so to “supply a fresh starting place for the law of
evidence . . . .”6 A similar fresh starting place is needed again today.
Part I of this Note provides relevant background information about both the
federal and Utah Rules of Evidence regarding the admissibility of expert witness
testimony. Part II discusses the issues that have developed in Utah law because of
the State’s minimal threshold standard. In particular, it examines how the standard
has significantly reduced the trial court’s role as gatekeeper and has increased the
risk of potentially unreliable testimony being admitted into court. Finally, Part III
explores potential changes that can be made to Utah Rule 702 to combat the
problems accompanying the low admissibility standard. One obvious approach is to
revert to the federal rule, which would come with many advantages. Yet there would
remain the problem of how then to treat years of Utah precedent. This Note proposes
a better, and encouragingly simple, solution: that Utah make a minor alteration to
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 that will allow the courts to get out from under flawed
precedent and give them a blank slate for analyzing and interpreting the rule. The
proposed change is to amend the rule by inserting words akin to “foundational
reliability” in place of the “threshold showing” language in the current Utah rule. At
*
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JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., Reliability and Fit of Expert Testimony, in 4 WEINSTEIN’S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.05, § 702.05 (2017).
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UTAH. R. EVID. 702.
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See infra Part II.
4
See infra Part II.
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See infra Part II.
6
UTAH. R. EVID. preliminary note.
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least one other state uses such language and has produced sturdier caselaw to support
its rule. This kind of change in Utah would decrease the risk of admitting unreliable
testimony as well as reinstate the gatekeeper function without wholesale
abandonment of prior Utah precedent.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Expert Witness Testimony in Federal Courts
1. The Frye Test
For nearly seventy years, federal courts in the United States applied the “Frye
test” to determine admissibility of expert witness testimony.7 In 1923, the D.C.
Circuit ruled that for expert witness testimony to be admissible, the proponent must
show that the underlying scientific method was “sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”8 The Frye test
gained popularity quickly, and the other federal circuits adopted the test.9 Many
States likewise followed suit.10 This “general acceptance” test was the dominant
standard in American evidentiary rulings until its proper scope and application
became the subject of much public debate.11 The test was criticized as being too
broad and vague while being simultaneously too strict and too lenient.12 Moreover,
opponents of the Frye test argued that it was no longer valid because Rule 70213 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which had been enacted by Congress in 1975, had
effectively superseded it.14

7

Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453, § 2 (2001).
8
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
9
Lustre, supra note 7.
10
Id.
11
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 586 (1993).
12
3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7:10
(4th ed. 2017).
13
See generally Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence
After Sixteen Years -- The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the
Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (1992) (discussing the continued validity of the Frye test
following adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Paul C. Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1250 (1980); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 883 (1982).
14
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (codified as amended at
FED. R. EVID. 702).
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2. Daubert as the Federal Standard
In 1993, the Supreme Court considered whether the Frye test was still a
workable standard or whether it had in fact been superseded by Rule 702.15 In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court decided that it had been
superseded.16 At the time of Daubert, Rule 702 stated that “[i]f scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.”17 The Court determined that there was nothing in Rule 702 that
established “general acceptance” as a strict prerequisite to admissibility.18 Indeed, it
felt a general acceptance requirement for expert testimony was “at odds with the
‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to opinion testimony.’”19 The Court then listed a “flexible” set of
factors that courts should consider for determining admissibility in conjunction with
Rule 702.20 These factors include whether the scientific theory or technique (1) can
be tested and falsified; (2) has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) has
a known or potential rate of error that is governed by standards; and (4) has general
acceptance within the relevant scientific community.21 “The crux of Daubert is that
courts are to act as gatekeepers . . . and are to look directly at the proffered evidence
and assess its validity and reliability.”22
The Supreme Court addressed issues relating to Rule 702 two more times in the
six years following Daubert. The first was in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, where
the Court held that a traditional abuse of discretion standard was appropriate for
reviewing Rule 702 evidentiary rulings and that appellate courts “may not
categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings
disallowing it.”23 In 1999, in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,24 the Court
clarified that Daubert applies to all expert testimony, including nonscientific
disciplines. Kumho also stands for the proposition that trial judges possess wide
latitude in determining admissibility of evidence, and, rather than being limited to
the factors in Daubert, they should assess reliability according to the “particular
15

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
Id. at 587.
17
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (codified as amended at
FED. R. EVID. 702).
18
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
19
Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
20
Id. at 594–95.
21
Id. at 593–95.
22
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 7:10.
23
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
24
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
16
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circumstances of the particular case at issue.”25 Thus, along with the refinements of
the rule laid out by General Electric and Kumho, Daubert remains the standard in
federal evidence cases.26
3. Amendments to Federal Rule 702
In response to Daubert, the Court approved an amendment to Rule 702 in the
year 2000.27 The Advisory Committee Notes (ACN) state that the “amendment
affirms the trial court’s role as gatekeeper and provides general standards that the
trial court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert
testimony.”28 The general standards set forth in the amended Rule 702 are still listed
in its current version:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.29
Daubert, as interpreted under the amended Rule 702, has since solidified its
place in American jurisprudence as the standard in federal evidentiary rulings.30
However, as Daubert based its ruling upon a federal statute and not the Constitution,
25

Id. at 150.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 7:10.
27
See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment.
28
Id.
29
FED. R. EVID. 702. The rule as quoted is how it reads as of October 2017. The text of
the rule after the 2000 Amendment was in a slightly different order than how the rule is
written presently. The rule was amended in 2011 “as part of the restyling of the Evidence
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent
throughout the rules. These changes [were] intended to be stylistic only. There [was] no
intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” There was no change in
the underlying text between the 2000 version of the rule and the 2011 version which is why
the current version is quoted here. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2011
amendments.
30
See PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.08 (Matthew Bender ed.)
(5th ed. 2017); 1 CYRIL H. WECHT, FORENSIC SCIENCES § 19.05 (Matthew Bender ed.)
(2018).
26
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it was and still is, not binding on the States.31 The States are, therefore, free to adopt
the Daubert standard, continue to follow the Frye test, or follow some combination
of the two.32
B. Expert Witness Testimony Under the Utah Rules
1. Utah’s Adoption of the Federal Rules
Shortly after the United States Supreme Court approved the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the Utah Supreme Court requested that the Utah State Bar Commission
create a special committee to analyze whether the State of Utah should adopt the
new Federal Rules of Evidence.33 Under the Constitution of Utah,34 and the Utah
Supreme Court’s statutory rulemaking power,35 the committee later recommended
adoption of the federal rules.36 Following that recommendation, the State of Utah
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1983 to “supply a fresh starting place for
the law of evidence” but not to “present an ultimate end.”37 The State copied the
federal rules verbatim, including Rule 702.38
2. Utah’s Version of the Frye Test
One of the first cases at the Utah Supreme Court that tested the newly adopted
Rule 702, and which became the standard for some time, was State v. Rimmasch.39
There, the Court decided what standard to apply to evidentiary rulings on the
admissibility of expert witness testimony,40 particularly in light of the recent
adoption of the federal rule and the State’s prior case law on the issue.41 The Court
decided to “follow[] the modern trend and abandon[] exclusive reliance on Frye.”42
31

GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 30, § 1.11.
Id.
33
UTAH R. EVID. preliminary note.
34
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
35
UTAH CODE § 78A-3-103 (2018).
36
UTAH R. EVID. preliminary note.
37
Id.
38
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989) superseded by rule, UTAH R.
EVID. 702, as recognized in, State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892 (Utah 2012).
39
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396.
40
Id.
41
See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 640–42 (Utah 1996) (reviewing the court’s
rule 702 jurisprudence); Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1362 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J.,
concurring) (noting that for judicial notice of “inherent reliability” the proffered expert
testimony must meet a very high level of reliability); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228,
1234 (Utah 1980) (holding that “the admissibility of scientific evidence, while taking into
account general scientific acceptance and widespread practical application, must focus in all
events on proof of inherent reliability” (emphasis added)).
42
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396.
32
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The Court followed the standard which was set out in Phillips v. Jackson, where
“‘inherent reliability’ . . . became the touchstone of admissibility.”43 This inherent
reliability analysis examined the “correctness of the principles underlying the
scientific testimony, the accuracy and reliability of the methods utilized in
application of the principles to the subject matter before the court, and the
qualifications of the experts who gathered and analyzed the data.”44 The Court
continued by explaining that “the purpose of a more restrictive test for judging the
admissibility of scientific testimony is to assure, as a threshold matter, that the
evidence is sufficiently reliable to go to the finder of fact.”45 The Rimmasch standard
was a valuable principle of law, but it was later found to have been superseded by a
puzzling amendment to Rule 702, which began the erosion of the gatekeeper
function.
3. Utah’s Departure from Daubert and Introduction of the Threshold Standard
The rule set forth in Rimmasch was the standard for admissibility of expert
witness testimony in Utah for many years.46 However, in 2007, Utah amended Rule
702, bolstering the idea of a “threshold showing” of reliability.47 Courts have
subsequently viewed Rimmasch as being superseded by the amended Rule 702,48
which departed from its federal counterpart in several respects, the most prominent
being the addition of the words “threshold showing.” Utah Rule 702 now reads:
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
43

Id.
Id. at 410 (Durham, J., concurring).
45
Id. at 396 (emphasis added) (citing Philips, 615 P.2d at 1233).
46
See, e.g., State v. Rothlisberger, 147 P.3d 1176, 1183 (Utah 2006) (noting the court
has “required a certain level of reliability for novel expert evidence”); State v. Larsen, 865
P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) (“[T]he question that must be posed prior to the admission of any
expert evidence is whether, ‘on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact’”
(quoting Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8)); State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 940 (Utah App. 1990)
(noting expert testimony offered in the instant case was the type rejected by the Utah
Supreme Court in Rimmasch).
47
UTAH R. EVID. 702(b).
48
See, e.g., State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892, 930 n. 134 (Utah 2012) (“In amending rule
702, we intended ‘to clarify the requirements for admission’ of expert testimony and
subsume the Rimmasch standard into rule 702.” (quoting Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis
Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762, 766 (Utah 2010))); State v. Guard, 316 P.3d 444, 453
(Utah App. 2013) (noting the updated rule 702 “‘subsume[s]’ the Rimmasch test” (citing
State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1114 (Utah 2009), (alteration in original) (rev’d 371 P.3d 1
(Utah 2015)).
44
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(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as
the basis for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the
principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the
underlying principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data
and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally
accepted by the relevant expert community.49
The ACN to the 2007 amendment states that, “[a]lthough Utah law
foreshadowed in many respects the developments in federal law that commenced
with Daubert, the 2007 amendment preserves and clarifies differences between the
Utah and federal approaches to expert testimony.”50 The ACN further stated that
trial judges should apply Rule 702 with “rational skepticism,” but the “degree of
scrutiny is not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other specialized
principles or methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria
fashioned to test reliability.”51
Based on the amended rule and the ACN, the Utah rule has been cobbled
together to retain bits and pieces of several tests. Section (a) of the amended rule,
apart from the introductory language, still tracks the federal rule and is a remnant of
the original federal rule from 1975.52 As indicated by the ACN, the amended Utah
rule is designed to apply to all evidentiary rulings consistent with the decision in
Kumho Tire.53 Yet, interestingly, section (c) of the amended Utah rule “retains
limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony.”54 And, as is most
relevant to this Note, the Utah rule inserted the words “threshold showing” into
section (b) of the amended rule.55 The ACN clarifies that, “[u]nlike the federal
rule . . . , the Utah rule notes that the proponent of the testimony is required to make
only a ‘threshold’ showing.”56 These words have become particularly troublesome
in Utah case law and have produced confusing and inconsistent results.

49

UTAH R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). The Utah rule was also amended in 2011 “as
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules.” UTAH R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes.
The amendments were “stylistic only.” Id. The major changes between Federal Rule 702 and
the Utah rule occurred during the 2007 amendments to the Utah rules. Id.
50
UTAH R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes.
51
Id.; see also Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762
(Utah 2010).
52
UTAH R. EVID. 702(a).
53
UTAH R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes.
54
Id.; see also State v. Quintana, 103 P.3d 168 (Utah 2004).
55
UTAH R. EVID. 702(b).
56
Id. (emphasis added).
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II. ISSUES CREATED BY UTAH’S MINIMAL THRESHOLD STANDARD
The 2007 amendment to Utah Rule 702, and in particular the addition of the
threshold standard, has not only become a procedural conundrum for trial court
gatekeepers, it has reduced evidentiary rulings to little more than a game of chance.
Presumably, the amended rule emphasized a “threshold showing” as a holdover from
Rimmasch where the Court said that district courts should determine the
admissibility of expert testimony “as a threshold matter.”57 Deciding something “as
a threshold matter” commonly means making a decision firstly, preliminarily, or as
a prerequisite to an action or event at a future date. This is not the case in Utah,
however. The idea of a “threshold showing,” at least under Utah’s evidence law, has
abandoned this common meaning. It now encapsulates the actual level of reliability
of evidence rather than deciding whether the evidence is reliable before allowing it
to go to the jury. As illustrated below, this level of reliability—which is now
described as a threshold level—is closer to a de minimis standard teetering on the
edge of being no real standard at all.
A. The Diminishing Role of Utah’s Gatekeepers
Since the amendment, state trial courts are left with a vague and ill-defined
standard for determining when proffered expert witness testimony has crossed the
elusive line of admissibility. Based on language from post-amendment cases58 that
have diminished the threshold showing of reliability, trial judges are now compelled
to give the benefit of the doubt to the experts and admit evidence even when there
is little more than the ipse dixit of the expert. This Note does not attempt to disregard
the importance of defining the roles between the triers of fact and law, but as the line
of post-amendment cases shows, the gatekeeper function of Utah’s judges has
eroded almost to obsolescence. Below are analyses of three Utah cases that illustrate
the diminishing role of the trial court gatekeepers. In all three, the trial courts, who
were inevitably more intimate with the facts of each case, concluded that the expert
witness opinions were unreliable only to be reversed because of Utah’s minimal
threshold standard.

57
58

State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989).
See infra Parts II.A.1–3.
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1. The Beginning of the End with Eskelson
The first significant Utah case59 that applied the amended Rule 702 was
Eskelson v. Davis Hospital60 in 2010. As noted previously, Rule 702(b) stipulates
that for evidence to be admissible, it must meet three criteria in light of the threshold
standard.61 The principles and methods underlying the testimony must be reliable,
based upon sufficient facts or data, and reliably applied to the facts.62 In Eskelson,
the father of a child who had suffered a perforated eardrum sought to introduce the
expert testimony of a medical doctor to show that the treating physician had departed
from the standard of care while trying to extract a foreign object from the child’s
ear.63 The defense moved to strike the testimony claiming it failed to meet the
threshold requirements of Rule 702.64 The district court granted the motion to strike
and found that the testimony did not comply with Rule 702 because the expert
physician’s “testimony was not based on any scientific, technical, or other scientific
knowledge, that his testimony would not assist the trier of fact, and that his methods
were not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.”65 Indeed, the
physician could not even articulate any scientific methodology.66
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court—in an opinion that produced more
questions than answers—reversed, using a 702(b) analysis.67 First, the Court
analyzed the district court’s decision under 702(b)(1).68 It determined that despite
the district court’s finding that the physician had employed little science in
producing his testimony, his prior experience as a doctor satisfied Utah’s minimal
threshold standard.69 The only rationale the Court offered to support its decision was
that the physician “had experience with the removal of foreign objects from the ears
of children,” which alone “satisfie[d] the threshold showing that [the physician’s]

59
One year earlier, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103
(Utah 2009), but the defendant in that case had been convicted prior to the 2007 amendment
to rule 702. The court analyzed the case under the previous rule as well as the amended rule,
but the holding in that case only related to eyewitness expert testimony. This Note does not
address the holding in Clopten nor does it analyze evidentiary rulings of eyewitness
testimony.
60
Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762 (Utah 2010).
61
UTAH R. EVID. 702(b).
62
Id.
63
Eskelson, 242 P.3d at 764.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 766.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 766–67.
69
Id.
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testimony was reliable.”70 In essence, the Court decided that, because the doctor had
seen similar situations before, his testimony was good enough.71
Next, the Supreme Court concluded that the expert’s opinion also satisfied the
requirements of 702(b)(2).72 The district court had found that the expert did not base
his testimony on sufficient facts and data because he had “selectively relied on only
certain testimony” to form his opinion.73 It had found that the physician “chose to
believe only facts in the record that supported his argument that [the other physician]
caused the injury while disregarding testimony that [the child] was tearful and
whiney before he arrived” at the hospital.74 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court again
found this to be erroneous and stated that, “[a]lthough an expert cannot give opinion
testimony that ‘flies in the face of uncontroverted physical facts also in evidence,’
an expert can rely on his own interpretation of facts that have a foundation in the
evidence, even if those facts are in dispute.”75 The Court reasoned that, “once [the
physician’s] testimony is admitted at trial, [the defense] will have the opportunity to
explore the factual basis for [the physician’s] testimony and point out the dispute
over the facts on which he relies.”76 While factual disputes admittedly can be pointed
out at trial, Rule 702 requires that the testimony first be reliable before it even makes
it to trial.77 The process of cherry-picking evidence and then forming an expert
opinion from that evidence is hardly a method that is “based upon sufficient facts or
data.”78
Finally, the Court also ruled that the physician’s testimony was admissible
under 702(b)(3).79 Eskelson’s physician testified that, because of his specialized
knowledge, he knew a sudden instance of pain normally accompanies the perforation
of an eardrum.80 The physician had analyzed the evidence and “identified [the
treating physician’s] examination as the point in time when this sudden instance of
pain occurred.”81 The Court stated in conclusory fashion that “[t]his testimony
clearly applies [the physician’s] specialized knowledge to the facts in evidence in a
way that satisfies the threshold showing of reliability required by rule 702.”82 Here
again, the Supreme Court resorted to the experience of the expert only and deemed
70

Id.
Id. (“Dr. Bateman’s testimony regarding his experience as a physician, in dealing
with similar situations as Jacob’s, constitutes a threshold showing of reliability.”).
72
Id. at 767.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 766.
75
Id. at 767 (quoting Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 110 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah
1941)).
76
Id.
77
UTAH R. EVID. 702.
78
Id.
79
Eskelson, 242 P.3d at 767–68.
80
Id. at 768.
81
Id.
82
Id.
71
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it reliable enough. This case aptly illustrates the beginning of the end of Utah’s
gatekeepers. The trial court fulfilled its role as gatekeeper to screen out unreliable
testimony. However, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the applicable standard
for a threshold showing is lower than that applied by the trial court and reversed the
exclusion of the expert testimony. Other than explaining that the standard for a
threshold showing is low, the Court set binding precedent with little guidance about
the right balance for gatekeepers to strike.
2. Gunn Hill Dairy Continues the Trend
Two years later, the Utah Court of Appeals took its turn in revealing the low
bar of the threshold standard when it decided Gunn Hill Dairy Properties v. L.A.
Department of Water & Power.83 A group of dairy farmers sued the owners of an
electrical power transmission company, alleging that high mortality rates and low
milk production in their livestock resulted from stray current produced by the power
company.84 Plaintiffs had hired an electrician to conduct electrical testing near their
farms, and the electrician “detected high levels of stray DC [current].”85 Following
this discovery, the electrician told a group of nearly one hundred local dairy farmers
that “local dairy herd deaths and disease levels were ‘too high’ because of the stray
electricity.”86 Subsequently, the plaintiffs hired counsel, electrical and power plant
engineering experts, and other experts and sued the defendant power company.87
The defendant promptly moved to exclude the opinions of the plaintiffs’ experts.88
After a five-day evidentiary hearing, the district court issued an order to exclude the
evidence concerning stray current.89 It articulated four reasons for excluding the
testimony.90 First, the expert’s “statements regarding symptoms contradicted the
Merck Veterinary Manual.”91 Second, the expert “failed to perform adequate
differential diagnosis testing on each individual dairy farm.”92 Third, the expert’s
epidemiological study was flawed.93 And fourth, the expert could not “establish
causation based on an epidemiological study because such a study is used to

83

Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 269 P.3d 980 (Utah
Ct. App. 2012).
84
Id. at 983.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 983–84.
88
Id. at 984.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 984–85.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
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establish association, not causation.”94 The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the
district court misinterpreted amended Rule 702.95
On review, the Court of Appeals set binding precedent that again significantly
lowered the bar for admissibility. It concluded first that, despite the Merck
Veterinary Manual’s stating that “controlled studies have not shown that stray
current causes the aforementioned problems,”96 the district court—even after a fiveday evidentiary hearing—had simply “confused the concepts of diagnosis with
effects of stray current.”97 Second, despite the trial court’s finding that the expert
failed to perform thorough investigations, the Court of Appeals decided the evidence
was admissible because “the fact that his testing was superficial at some farms does
not make the evidence inadmissible,” but “it may lessen the value of his expert
testimony.”98 Third, the Court of Appeals felt that, despite the flaws in the expert’s
testimony and methodology, the evidence should nevertheless be admitted “because
no epidemiological study is flawless.”99
The bottom line is that the Court of Appeals was only following precedent. It
relied on the fact that Utah’s threshold standard “requires only a basic foundational
showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be admissible.”100 Of course,
the Court of Appeals should not bear full responsibility for issuing a standard that is
merely a hiccup. It was merely following the ACN, and the “threshold showing”
language had already been indelibly written in the books.
The Court continued its reasoning by noting that “the line between assessing
reliability and weighing evidence can be elusive” and that the court only plays a
preliminary role because “the factfinder bears the ultimate responsibility for
evaluating the accuracy, reliability, and weight of the testimony.”101 It further
explained that when a court seeks to evaluate the weight of expert testimony rather
than its threshold liability, it risks going beyond the scope of its gatekeeper
responsibility and “into the factfinder’s territory.”102
That said, this decision highlights precisely the problem with Utah’s Rule 702
cases—that the rule conflates the preliminary role of assessing reliability with
94
Id. For several reasons the trial court also concluded the expert’s opinion regarding
damages unreliable and therefore inadmissible. “The court permitted [the expert] to render
certain other opinions.” Id.
95
Id. at 985.
96
Id. at 992.
97
Id. at 992–93.
98
Id. at 993.
99
Id. at 994.
100
Id. at 993 (quoting UTAH R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes); see also State
v. Sheehan, 273 P.3d 417, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (“[W]hile the trial court acts as a
gatekeeper to keep expert evidence that is not reliable from the fact finder, this threshold
determination does not extend to exclude contradictory evidence.”).
101
Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 269 P.3d 980, 995
(Utah Ct. App. 2012).
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determining the actual level of reliability. Deciding evidence is reliable enough to
pass a wisp of threshold is not the same as preliminarily deciding evidence actually
is reliable. While it is proper that the court be limited to a preliminary role only, and
for the factfinder to ultimately weigh the evidence, Utah’s gatekeepers should not
be required to divine some elusive and ethereal line in their preliminary
responsibility of “screen[ing] out unreliable expert testimony.”103 The gatekeeper’s
job is to make sure that only reliable testimony is placed at the feet of the finder of
fact.104 Again, the district court in this case had good reason to exclude the testimony
and even conducted a five-day evidentiary hearing before doing so, but the Court of
Appeals was bound to reverse because of Utah’s threshold standard precedent.
3. Finishing It Off with Majors
In a more recent case, 105 the Utah Court of Appeals again addressed whether
expert testimony had met the threshold showing and again was compelled to reverse
a trial court’s decision because of the low standard. In Majors v. Owens,106 the
Majorses were involved in a car accident and allegedly suffered neck and back
injuries because of it.107 To support their claim, they hired physician experts to
testify that the injuries were caused by the accident.108 The defendants argued that
the Majorses’ experts did no more than establish a chronological relationship
between the time of the car accident and the Majorses’ alleged injuries.109 The
defendants then moved to exclude the testimonies of the Majorses’ expert witnesses
because their opinions were not based on any reliable facts or methodology.110

103

Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762, 766. (Utah
2010); see also Sheehan, 273 P.3d at 435 (“[T]he trial court acts as a gatekeeper to keep
expert evidence that is not reliable from the fact finder”).
104
See Sheehan, 273 P.3d at 435.
105
See Majors v. Owens, 365 P.3d 165 (Utah Ct. App. 2015), cert. granted, 384 P.3d
1139 (Utah 2016). The Utah Court of Appeals has decided more recent evidence cases citing
the amended Rule 702, but none more recent than Majors in determining if the threshold
showing has been met. See State v. Yalowski, 404 P.3d 53, 59–61 (Utah Ct. App. 2017);
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 397 P.3d 772, 775–77 (Utah Ct. App. 2017).
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed Rule 702 in recent cases. See State v.
Griffin, 384 P.3d 186, 202–03 (Utah 2016) (holding that DNA evidence met the threshold
standard); State v. Guard, 371 P.3d 1, 19 (Utah 2015) (holding that, under Clopton,
eyewitness expert testimony requires a showing of reliability); State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d
1103, 1104–11 (Utah 2009).
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Majors v. Owens, 365 P.3d 165 (Utah Ct. App. 2015), cert. granted, 384 P.3d 1139
(Utah 2016).
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Id. at 166.
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The district court agreed and granted the motion.111 It found that the treating
physicians’ opinions were unreliable and inadmissible under Rule 702.112 It
maintained that “an expert must do more than merely establish a chronological
relationship between an accident and the patient’s symptoms” and that the physician
expert “reach[ed] assumptions based on chronology without any underlying analysis
of the [Majorses’] prior medical problems.” 113 They performed no independent
analysis nor reviewed the Majorses’ “significant medical histories as contributing or
aggravating factors to their medical conditions.”114 The medical doctors even
seemed “to acknowledge their complete failure to independently analyze other
potential causes.”115 Based on this reasoning, the district court felt that “the jury
would engage in speculation rather than fact finding”116 and excluded the testimony.
Following the analysis set forth in Eskelson, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed
the decision to exclude and held that the experts’ testimony was admissible because
it had met the threshold requirements of Rule 702.117 It said that, “[a]lthough the
foundation for the [experts’] opinions appears somewhat thin, . . . the district court’s
preliminary assessment of the [experts’] reliability displaced the role of the jury to
evaluate the weight to be given to the evidence.”118 The Court further reasoned that
while the expert opinions had weaknesses, the defense would “have the opportunity
to expose and probe such weaknesses once the opinions [were] admitted at trial.”119
So again, a Utah appellate court felt that it had little choice but to reverse a trial
court’s decision to exclude expert witness testimony because Utah’s threshold
showing standard is more like a barely reliable standard than simply a threshold
matter. As these three cases show, Utah’s gatekeepers are not shielding the jury from
much, if any, testimony. Utah’s “reliability standard” has now become more a
standard of almost no reliability.
B. The Risk of Admitting Unreliable Testimony Is Increased
Because Utah trial courts are required to find only a “basic foundational
showing of indicia of reliability”120 before admitting expert witness testimony, the
risk is becoming increasingly great that unreliable testimony will make its way to
the jury. As the above cases demonstrate, if a trial court decides that certain expert
opinions are unreliable, they do so at the risk of being reversed by appellate courts
111

Id.
Id. at 167.
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Id. (alterations in original).
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(Utah Ct. App. 2012) (quoting UTAH R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes) (emphasis
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on the grounds that the minimal threshold standard was indeed met. What is the point
of having gatekeepers if they are bound by statute and precedent to find nothing
more than a shadow of reliability before deeming the evidence “reliable enough” for
the jury to hear? Not to say that every time a trial court decides to exclude testimony,
it will automatically be reversed by an appellate court. If, for example, the proffered
expert were a random passerby having zero credentials and an opinion based on
absolutely no scientific methods, and the trial court excluded the testimony, an
appellate court would surely agree. But that does not change the fact that Utah’s
threshold standard has been getting weaker and weaker. As the standard continues
to shrink, the risk of unreliable testimony reaching the jury increases. This brings
with it its own set of issues, including juries engaging in excessive speculation,
courts admitting “junk science,” and cases being decided incorrectly by juries that
were influenced by persuasive—yet unreliable—expert opinions.121
Although Daubert does not bind the States, the Supreme Court has clarified
that an essential function of the gatekeeping responsibility is to “ensure that any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”122
The Utah Supreme Court echoed that idea when it said trial judges must, in their
gatekeeper responsibility, “screen out unreliable expert testimony.”123 But how can
trial courts meet their obligation to “screen out unreliable evidence” when binding
precedent requires them to refrain from weighing the reliability of the evidence?
Utah needs this Catch-22124 standard to be corrected to give judges the ability to
make meaningful decisions to exclude or admit expert testimony.
III. POTENTIAL CHANGES TO RULE 702
Utah Rule 702 needs amending. The line of cases applying the rule has done
nothing more than establish that, in Utah, everything short of laughable makes it
121

See, e.g., Best v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 176–77 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“Daubert attempts to strike a balance between a liberal admissibility standard for relevant
evidence on the one hand and the need to exclude misleading ‘junk science’ on the other.”);
David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific
Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 909–10 (2013) (explaining that
Daubert was meant to “hold the line against junk science and . . . intended to tighten the rules
of expert evidence”); N. J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect: The Impact
of Judges’ Admissibility Decisions on the Persuasiveness of Expert Testimony, 15 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 1, 13 (2009) (noting that a judge’s decision to admit “junk science” would
“endow[] that evidence with additional weight . . . .”).
122
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 586, 589 (1993)
(emphasis added).
123
Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762, 766 (Utah
2010).
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Catch-22, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
catch-22 [https://perma.cc/HF5E-74WZ] (last visited July 28, 2018) (“circumstance or rule
that denies a solution”).
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through the gate. The jury is not shielded from unreliable expert testimony, and the
gatekeepers are all but ineffective. Deciding how the rule should be amended,
though, is a much more difficult and challenging task. The first potential solution,
and maybe the easiest to implement, is to adopt the current version of the federal
rule. Embracing the federal rule, however, comes with its own challenges and may
not prove workable under existing Utah precedent. Another solution would be to
model a rule after the rules of other States that do not follow the federal rule. These
alternatives are each discussed below.
A. Adopting the Current Version of Federal Rule 702
Adopting, verbatim, the current version of the federal rule comes with both
advantages and disadvantages. The most significant difference between the federal
rule and the Utah rule is the “threshold showing” requirement in subsection (b).125
Another major difference is subsection (c) which exists only to explain the insertion
of the minimal threshold standard.126 If Utah were to adopt the Federal Rule 702, the
threshold showing requirement in subsection (b) and the entirety of subsection (c)
would no longer exist. The remaining text of the Utah rule is essentially the same as
the federal rule.127 The potential advantages of adopting the federal rule are at least
twofold. First, Utah courts would enjoy greater efficiency in deciding cases because
of the ability to tap into a large body of persuasive caselaw from which to draw
analogous support. There are 108 federal courts in the U.S., comprised of ninetyfour district courts, thirteen circuit courts, and the United States Supreme Court.128
As it now stands, federal cases applying Rule 702 are wholly inapplicable to Utah
cases as the two jurisdictions rely on entirely different standards. Because there are
more cases dealing with Federal Rule 702, both in terms of the number of courts and
length of time courts have been deciding cases under the rule, Utah courts would be
able to more quickly locate and compare cases that have the same or similar fact
patterns. Not only would the process of deciding expert witness testimony cases
become more efficient, there would be less doubt as to which kind of evidence is
admissible and which is not. Although the federal cases would not be binding on the
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UTAH R. EVID. 702(b).
UTAH R. EVID. 702(c).
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The mere deletion of subsections (b) and (c) in the Utah rule would not produce text
that is precisely identical to the federal rule. As a result of the 2007 amendment to the Utah
rule, certain words and phrases taken from the federal rule ended up in different subsections
and sequences of the Utah rule. For example, the phrase “principles and methods” occurs
twice in the federal rule and is retained in subsection (b) of the Utah rule immediately
following the “threshold showing.” Compare UTAH. R. EVID. 702 with FED. R. EVID. 702.
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Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, Justice 101: Introduction to the Federal Court System,
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts
[https://perma.cc/35QL-ZJQN].
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Utah courts, adoption of the federal rule would place a much greater body of caselaw
at their fingertips.
Second, and more importantly, there would be a higher standard for
admissibility, which would reduce the risk of admitting unreliable testimony. As
pointed out above, Utah’s threshold standard for reliability is easily cleared, and
potentially unreliable testimony is more likely to be admitted because of it. The
federal rule does not include the words “threshold showing.”129 The federal standard
is higher than the Utah standard: The federal rule simply states that a qualified expert
may testify if “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact . . . ; the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.”130 Based on Daubert131 and its progeny, trial judges must “ensure” that
the “testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”132 The
question in federal cases is not whether the expert testimony meets the “elusive”133
and “somewhat thin”134 threshold standard, but whether it is, in fact, reliable.
As with any change to an established law, there are disadvantages. The same is
true of electing to adopt the current version of Federal Rule 702 in Utah. If Utah
were to revert to the federal rule, the first question would be whether all the cases
that applied the Utah rule as amended from 2007 to the present day are overruled or
superseded by the rule change. That is over ten years of caselaw that may be
invalidated or simply brushed under the rug. It is well-known that the “Court’s
authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on
sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.”135 To throw out every Rule 702
case from the last ten years would not be wise. Therefore, adopting the federal rule
while maintaining adherence to Utah precedent would be a tricky task indeed.
Another potential downside of adopting the federal rule is the possibility that
too much expert testimony will be excluded from the jury. It is settled that “the
factfinder bears the ultimate responsibility for evaluating the accuracy, reliability,
and weight of the testimony.”136 If Utah’s threshold standard has reached the point
of letting too much in, the opposite could also become true if the threshold were
raised: It could keep too much out. A reliability standard that is too high could tread
“into the factfinder’s territory.”137 Finally, there is also the possibility that trial court
judges could abuse their gatekeeper responsibilities and exclude expert testimony
too often. This, of course, could be corrected through the appeals process, but that
129
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would still mean delaying final decisions and expending additional State and litigant
funds to pursue interlocutory appeals. In sum, adoption of the federal rule may prove
workable, but if Utah chooses this route, it needs to understand the problems that
come with it, and it needs to be willing to live with those consequences.
B. Modeling Other States’ Rule 702
Another option to consider for revamping Utah Rule 702 is to look at other
States to see how they have treated their own rules of evidence post-Frye and
Daubert. Twenty-five States have followed Daubert or adopted tests that are
extremely similar,138 and their respective rules on expert testimony essentially mirror
the original federal rule.139 Fifteen of the States have elected to continue to follow
the traditional Frye test, and six States have not wholly or expressly rejected Frye
but apply the Daubert factors.140 Utah is one of the four remaining States that has
developed its own evidence test.141 Utah, however, is the only State in the nation that
relies on a minimal “threshold” standard.142 Other States have developed rules that
closely resemble the Utah rule, absent the threshold language.143 Utah could follow
the example of those States, but doing so would have more or less the same impact
as adopting the federal rule, which was discussed above.
The pros and cons identified in Section III.A above also apply if Utah were to
emulate the rules of other States: To follow those rules could result in the
overturning of years of Utah precedent and risk excluding previously admissible
evidence. That could, in turn, disrupt the practices of many trial attorneys and trial
judges that have become accustomed to Utah’s minimal standard.
Perhaps the best solution is to amend the rule in such a way that would raise
the threshold standard and restore the gatekeeping function of judges but do so
discarding the “threshold” language. A promising amendment may look to the
Minnesota expert witness rule.
Minnesota’s rule on expert witness testimony begins by tracking the original
federal rule, much like Utah’s rule, but then adds the qualifier of “foundational
reliability.”144 The rule reads:
138

See Lustre, supra note 7, §§3–53 (cataloguing whether each state applies Daubert
or a similar test).
139
See, e.g., COLO. R. EVID. 702; IDAHO R. EVID. RULE 702; CONN. CODE EVID. 7-2;
TENN. R. EVID. 702, 2001 advisory comm’n cmt. (affirming that, “[t]he Frye test no longer
exists in Tennessee. In McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (1997), the
Tennessee Supreme Court listed five nonexclusive factors taken from the federal case of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)”).
140
See Lustre, supra note 7, §§8–53.
141
See id. Georgia, Virginia, and Wisconsin are the other states that have developed
their own separate tests. Id.
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Id. at § 51.
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See, e.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 702; FLA. STAT. TITLE VII § 90.702; MICH. R. EVID. 702.
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If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The
opinion must have foundational reliability. In addition, if the opinion or
evidence involves novel scientific theory, the proponent must establish
that the underlying scientific evidence is generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community.145
It may not be apparent from reading “foundational reliability” on the face of
the rule that this verbiage bears any significant difference from the “threshold
showing” language in the Utah rule. It is therefore essential to see how the Minnesota
courts have interpreted this language. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that
“foundational reliability ‘requires the proponent of a . . . test [to] establish that the
test itself is reliable and that its administration in the particular instance conformed
to the procedure necessary to ensure reliability.’”146 In 2006, Minnesota amended its
Rule 702 and added the last two sentences now contained in the rule.147 Like Utah’s
Rule 702(c), which is a remnant of the old Frye test, Minnesota’s foundational
reliability is also viewed through the Frye lens.148 The main difference between
Minnesota’s standard and Utah’s standard is one that concerns the level of reliability
of the evidence. Where “threshold reliability” and “foundational reliability” may be
viewed as synonymous semantically, the state courts’ interpretations of their own
respective rules expose the difference.
As noted, the Utah cases demonstrate that Utah appellate courts will likely
reverse a district court’s order excluding expert witness testimony because of the
threshold standard is very low. Minnesota, on the other hand, has taken a more
gatekeeper-friendly approach to their “foundational reliability” standard. In Doe v.
Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis,149 the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld
a district court’s decision to exclude expert witness testimony because the testimony
had not cleared the foundational reliability standard.150 In that case, the expert for
the plaintiff “presented 328 peer-reviewed scientific research articles purporting to
show that repressed and recovered memory exists and that the theory is scientifically
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reliable.”151 One of the experts testified that “repressed memories not only exist, but
that, when recovered, those memories are accurate.”152
In response, the defense presented an expert that opined that the “theory of
repressed and recovered memory is ‘highly controversial’ and that ‘[s]ome have
called it the most heated debate currently in psychiatry.’”153 The expert for the
defense felt the theory could not be “generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community because something cannot be both generally accepted and highly
controversial and debated.”154 The expert continued, saying that—notwithstanding
their large quantity—the 328 articles presented by the plaintiff’s experts were
without merit because of methodological flaws.155 The defense then moved to
exclude the opinions of the plaintiff’s experts.156 After a three-day hearing on the
admissibility of the testimony, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s expert
testimony had not reached the foundationally reliable standard, and the Supreme
Court affirmed.157 Archdiocese is not an isolated case in Minnesota, and it is evident
from other cases158 that Minnesota’s version of “foundational reliability” is a higher
standard than is Utah’s. The expert opinion in Archdiocese would surely have been
admitted had it been filed in Utah.
Minnesota’s take, or a similar approach, on the standard of admissibility of
expert witness testimony serves as a good model for Utah. If Utah amended Rule
702 to be similar to Minnesota’s amended rule and interpreted the purpose of the
rule to “ensure reliability” like the language in Archdiocese, 159 Utah would raise the
admissibility standard and restore the gatekeeper function without compromising
prior Utah precedent. This is because the “foundational reliability” language of the
Minnesota rule is comparable to the language in the Utah rule and the consequences
of adopting a Minnesota-like rule would be less disruptive of Utah precedent than
simply adopting the federal rule. If Utah were to amend Rule 702 and give it slightly
151

Id. at 157.
Id.
153
Id. at 158 (quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See, e.g., State v. Uldrych, No. A13-1792, 2015 WL 1013537 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar.
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more teeth, requiring judges to ensure reliability prior to admitting expert testimony,
Utah’s threshold standard would be raised to an appropriate level.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Utah’s Rule 702 on the admissibility of expert witness testimony
is far too low. Utah trial courts cannot to fulfill their role as gatekeepers because the
threshold standard forces them to admit almost everything without ensuring
reliability. Accordingly, Utah evidence law will benefit from amending Rule 702
whether it reverts to the federal rule or elects the Minnesota approach. Either is
preferred to the almost nonexistent standard currently in place, which has drifted far
from the “inherent[ly] reliab[le]” tradition and is no longer “the touchstone of
admissibility”160 in Utah. The State should amend Rule of Evidence 702 to allow
judges to make meaningful decisions on the admissibility of expert testimony once
again.
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